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Aspects of Sunyata and 
Consciousness in Mahayana-
Buddhism 
Michael von Bruck* 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The Buddha's original teaching was not the philosophical 
discourse but spiritual instruction. The first sermon at Sarnath 
does not contain any theory of consciousness. However, the 
underlying assumption for the Four noble truths is the theory 
of karman. The different schools of thought in India have 
come up with modified interpretations concerning karman, 
but it is uncertain whether the Buddha himself knew of 
philosophical subtleties which were implied in this concept. 
His w a s an analysis of suffering, and this analysis w a s based 
on a unique spiritual experience. 
It is an other question to analyze whether the anatta-
doctrine does necessarily belong to the earliest stock of 
Buddhist interpretation or not. We do not have sufficient 
historical evidence on earliest Buddhism, and therefore the 
question can be answered only by inference. 1 Whatever the 
answer might be, it is obvious that the whole argument 
concerning the Four noble truths rests on the assumption 
* D R . M I C H A E L V O N BRÜCK, Univers i ty of Tübingen, W . G E R M A N Y 
1. C p . J . P e r e z - R e m o n , Sel f and N o n - S e l f in Ear ly B u d d h i s m , Mouton (The 
H a g u e - P a r i s - N e w Y o r k ) , 1 9 8 0 . 
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of some theory of reincarnation. The basic contradiction in 
all later Buddhist thought - whether the Buddha was already 
aware of it or not-is anatta on the one side and rebirth on 
the other s ide . 2 It is-depending on the way how anatta is 
understood-a possible contradiction which is the driving force 
behind the development of an understanding of vijnäna 
(consciousness) which can be understood as the meta-theory 
which is to resolve precisely this contradiction on the grounds 
of a more comprehensive framework comprising both the attaj 
artaifa-dilemma and the reincarnational view. Thus, the theory 
of consciousness is to comprise this contradiction on a higher 
level, and this is precisely the attempt of philosophical re­
asoning in Mahäyäna-Buddhism, both in Mädhyamika and 
Vijnanävada thought. 
In Indian philosophies we can roughly distinguish two 
different perceptions of " s o u l " or "self" which seem to be 
prevalent from the very beginning as structuraiizing factors 
concerning the later psychological or metaphysical develop­
ments, including Buddhism. 3 
1. There is a notion of "sel f" which is pure awareness 
or pure consciousness, it is a factor of knowing and luminosity 
without any limiting adjunct or specific content, absolutely 
transcendental to any real perception; it is static and beyond 
change. This is what the Upanisads refer to and is later 
the basis for Vedäntic philosophy, but it is also the respective 
principle in Samkhya. 
2. There is a notion of " s e l f " which has or is always 
a specific content, it is shaped and bears the marks of 
2 . T h i s problem w a s seen a l ready in ear l ier Buddho logy in the West , c p . 
E. Wol f f , Zur Lehre vom Bewußtse in ( V i j n ä n a v a d a ) bei den späteren 
B u d d h i s t e n . Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung d e s Lankävatärasat ra , 
Winter ( H e i d e l b e r g ) , 1930, : p . 9f. 
3 . Pratap C h a n d r a , M e t a p h y s i c s of Perpetual C h a n g e . The Concept of Sel f 
in E a r l y B u d d h i s m , S o m a i y a ( B o m b a y - N e w D e l h i ) , 1 9 7 8 , p. 190f . 
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individuality. It is an entity which is the very focus of 
individuality; it is and remains distinct from other similar 
entities and therefore calls for realistic pluralism in any philo­
sophical analysis. This is obviously the basic intuition in 
Jainism, but also of influence to Hindu and Buddhist schools 
of thought. 
The Buddhist concept of consciousness (v/'nnäna/v//näna) 
seems to be a concept which is trying to combine the two 
in so far as it is beyond the ordinary conceptual factors in 
being a mere capacity which depends on other factors such 
as the senses and sense-objects on the one hand, and a 
principle of continuity in change which accounts for the 
perpetuation of the karmic chain leading into the next rebirth, 
1. e. taking on the function of the jiva of the J a i n s , on the 
other hand. Already in early Buddhism w e have the important 
function of this vihnäna mentioned in many Suttas, and in 
later Mahäyäna developments - not only in the Vijnänavada-
S c h o o l - i t developed into a kind of ultimate principle in general, 
but here always understood in relation to the basic experience 
of sünyatä as a non-dualistic and radicalized interpretation 
of the early concept of anicca and anatta in their mutual 
relationship. 
The following explanations are an attempt to rise a few 
points for observation concerning the basic Buddhist view. 
2 . E a r l y D e v e l o p m e n t s 
The most distinct feature of Buddhism with regard to 
other Indian philosophical schools at that time is certainly 
the anatta-aooXxme as stated in Samyutta-Nikäya III, 1 3 2 : 
sabbe dhammä aniccä dukkhä anatta, w h i c h means that all 
formations are impermanent, miserable and without "self". 
A few questions arise already with regard to this classical 
formula. First of all it has to be understood that obviously the 
conclusion: impermanence is suffering, was not at all questioned. 
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Why not? If w e look into the earlier Vedic tradition we cannot 
take such a v iew for granted, and even in the Upanisads there 
is an implicit and explicit argument for the devaluation of what 
later was called the vyävahärika: the bra hman-ätman-xeaWty 
was much more splendid than what the senses could grasp, 
ordinary reality being a mere shadow of what really is. This 
argument does not work for the Buddhist view, because nothing 
else than the skandhas have real being. Samyutta-Nikäya 
II, 53 just dec la res : yad aniccam tarn dukkham. 
There is a reason for this implicit link, and the reason is 
precisely implied in the topic of this paper. The link between 
anicca and dukkha lies in the nature of consciousness and in 
the perception of sünyata, which became a key concept much 
later, of course, but which is the implicit experience already in 
earliest Buddhism that allows for the unquestioned relationship 
between anicca and dukkha. But this we shall develop later. 
Is there a kind of permanent principle in the human person 
or not? Concerning this question Buddhologists are as divided 
as the Buddhists themselves, and the whole history of the 18 
schools of early Buddhism is a commentary on this unresolved 
problem. 
Not only the Pudgalavädins tried to introduce a principle of 
continuity, but the Sauträntikas even argued that it were the 
skandhas which transmigrated from one life to the other. They 
postulated the seeds of goodness which w a s some kind of 
incorruptible nature of Man which is the basis for that which 
attains Nirvana. The Yogäcärins worked this out into a theory 
of undestructible dharmas which are seeds in the continuous 
stream and so on. W e could go on, but as Edward Conze 
says: " T h e s e 'pseudo-selves ' are not easy to study, partly 
because there is little precise information, and partly because 
the concepts themselves are distinctly indefinite''. 4 With regard 
4 . E . C o n z e , B u d d h i s t Thought in India , A l l e n & U n w i n (London) , 1 9 6 2 , 
p. 1 3 2 . 
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to Western and also recent Eastern scholarship and reception of 
Buddhism it is interesting to see how different ideological inte­
rests have influenced the reading (and misreading) of texts, 
from Schopenhauer to Rhys Davids in controversy with Kern 
and Stcherbatsky, or Georg Grimm versus Heinrich von Glasen-
app. 5 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy tried to prove that the Buddha 
and Sankara said the same, the Enlightened one only via 
negativa, the preceptor of Vedänta via eminentiae.6 Those 
comparisons, I dare to suggest, are not very useful, because 
firstly they project later Vedäntic developments - there is a gap 
of more than thousand years between the Buddha and Sankara 
and considerable Buddhist influence on his Advaita Vedänta - onto 
earlier history, and secondly the terms for "consc iousness" , 
"self", "person" etc. are used in an uncritical way mostly reflect­
ing the conscious or unconscious philosophy of the interpreter 
than being founded on a careful analysis. Today there is a 
tendency to assume that the Buddha did not deny a "self" in 
the more comprehensive and totally transcendend sense, 
though he definitly negated the empirical " I" as the centre of 
attachment. 7 For Western Buddhists this is the articulus statis 
et cadentis ecclesiae as an interesting controversy in the Journal 
" Y a n a " of the "Altbuddhistische Gemeinde" in Germany (Vol.4, 
1951) , and also the disputed position of Christmas Humphreys 8 
show. 
Let us highlight some of the developments in early 
Buddhism. The basic insight of the Buddha is that all is univer­
sal flux, and there is nothing else. The theory of the five 
5. Pratap C h a n d r a , op . c i t . , p. 112ff . 
6. C p . L. de S i l v a , The Problem of Se l f in B u d d h i s m and Chr is t ian i ty , The 
Study Centre ( C o l o m b o ) , 1 9 7 5 , p. 55f . 
7 . H. Nakamura , Die Grundlehren des B u d d h i s m u s , ihre Wurzeln in G e s c h i ­
chte und Tradi t ion, in: B u d d h i s m u s der G e g e n w a r t (ed . by Η. D u m o u l i n ) , 
Herder (Fre iburg) , 1 9 7 0 , pp. 18ff.; s e e a l s o M. S h i m i z u , D a s " S e l b s t " 
im M a h ä V ä n a - B u d d h i s m u s in J a p a n i s c h e r S i c h t und die " P e r s o n " im 
Chr istentum im L ich t des Neuen T e s t a m e n t s , Br i l l ( L e i d e n ) , 1981 , p. ; 1 5 . 
8. de S i l v a , op . c i t . , p. 6 0 . 
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khandhasjskandhas wants to bring out precisely this point. 
They are combinations which decay as soon as they have 
synthesized. The aggregates, however, are. And the flux is. 
Thus, we have a realistic pluralism concerning the aggregates 9 , 
and we have an unchanging formative principle with regard to 
the flux. All the different Buddhist schools took this as a basis 
to avoid both tho extremes, nihilism or better total negationalism 
(uccedavada) as well asetcrnalism with regard to a "substantial 
s o u l " (sassatavada). The argument against atta has had a lways 
an analytical and an ethical dimension. 
But this is not all. There are sufficient scriptural passages 
which hint to something as coordinator of the karmic impressions, 
though this is definitely not an independent self. To give just 
a few examples I will come up with the famous story from the 
Bhärahära-Sutta in the Samyutta-Nikäya, I I I . 1 0 The Buddha com­
pares to human being with an entity bearing a burden (bharam) 
which is the combination of the different factors of grasping. 
Yet, there is a bearer of the burden (bhäraharam) apart from 
the five aggregates, and this is a kind of "person" (puggalo) 
with a specific name and a distinguishable family-background. 
The three cravings are taking hold of the burden (bhärädänam)t 
and the end of craving is the act of laying down the burden 
(bhäranikkhepan). It is obvious that the Buddha describes the 
spiritual path to liberation, and there is a subject on that path. 
There are other "se l f -passages" in the Dhammapada (\ 60, 380,), 
the Mahäparinibbäna-Sutta etc. 
There is a moral transcendence of the " s e l f of a person 
who has attained liberation, a "higher s e l f which is beyond 
samsaric bondage, searched for by Mara, the enemy and temp-
tator, and for him impossible to r e a c h . 1 1 
9. T h . S tcherba tsky , The Concept ion of Buddhis t N i rvana , Moti laJ B a n a r -
s i d a s s ( D e l h i ) , 1 9 7 8 , II, p. 5 5 . 
10 . C p . the history of interpretation of th is text in Pratap C h a n d r a , op. c i t . , 
p. 120f. 
11 . A n e x e g e s i s of the relevant p a s s a g e s is given by P e r e z - R e m o n , op. 
ci t . , p. 278f f . 
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Maybe more interesting is an other evidence because a 
good amount of probability is there that w e touch on historical 
ground of the earliest Buddhist community: the question of 
suicide of a liberated being, an arahat. There w a s no question 
that suicide cannot bring any gain, because it is only the body 
which could be killed. The karmic imprints (sankhäralsamskära) 
would remain, and more, by committing suicide one would only 
add two problems: a) an other and new violent act would only 
result in further karmic consequences, and b) a good opportunity 
of Dhamma-practice in this precious human birth would be 
wasted. But what about an arahat who had burnt up all Karma 
so that nothing could travel into the next reincarnation? 
Samyutta-Nikäya I, 120f. (Märasamyutta 23) and l l / l l l , 344 
(Khandhasamyutta 87) reports the strange story that Mära, the 
personification of karmic hindrances and obstruction, moves 
around in a smoky cloud in order to search for the " s o u l " or 
the rebirth-consciousness of an arahant who had committed 
suicide. Naturally Mära failed to find anything, because that 
being was already liberated and no "karmic stuff" could be 
around. Yet, what the story shows is that early Buddhism 
obviously did not deny a certain kind of "coherent substance ' ' 
which after death - i.e. independent of the aggregates - w a s left 
behind. Needless to say that the Buddha himself would never 
have indulged to answer the possible question what this cohe­
rent entity would be. 
Rather unusual (and therefore with some historical back-
aground?) is also the story in the Mahäparinirväna-Sütra 
L ( 16/1 f t ) 1 2 which recollects the "treaty" between Buddha and 
Mara. Buddha had attained enlightenment, and Mära wanted 
to persuade him to enter Nirvana immediately in order to prevent 
12 . E . W a l d s c h m i d t , D a s Mahäpar in i rvänasü t ra . Text in S a n s k r i t und T i b e t i s c h , 
verg l ichen mit dem PßW nebst einer Übersetzung der c h i n e s i s c h e n E n t ­
sprechung im V i n a y a der M ü l a s a r v ä s t i v ä d i n s , A b h a n d l u n g e n der D e u t s c -
t. hen ; Akactemie der W i s s e n s c h a f t e n zu Ber l in , K l a s s e für S p r a c h e n , L i t e r a ­
tur und Kunst J g . 1950 , 2 , A k a d e m i e - V e r l a g ( B e r l i n ) , 1 9 5 1 , p. 209 f f . 
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other beings from becoming enlightened, i.e. freed from Mära's 
own power and influence. The Buddha had refused but offered 
to enter Nirvana as soon as the teaching had spread sufficiently 
and the Samgha be established firmly. Now at the end of his 
life in Vaisäli Mära returns and asks the Buddha: parinirvähi 
bhagavan Parinirvönasamayah sugatasya, it is time, Nirvana is 
there, may the Exalted One please enter into Parinirväna. Again, 
this refers to a kind of continuous principle which Mära has 
control of if it is not liberated or transferred into an other level of 
existence. The motive of the "pact with the devil" is old and 
appears here and there in the history of religions, and Buddhism 
is by no means an exception. The unusual story (including 
Ananda's failure to change the mind of the Buddha to stay on) , 
however, would not have entered the canon if it would not 
have had a strong support in the belief-system of early Buddhists. 
But what then is this "entity" leaving the body after death 
and entering a new body or Nirvana? Buddhism compares it to 
the flame, w h i c h in the second case is blown out. Western 
scholarship has often interpreted this comparison as extinguish­
ing the existence of this "entity". But this is w r o n g . 1 3 In 
Maj jhima-Nikäya (I, 487ff.) it is one Vacchagotta who asks the 
Buddha about the destiny of an Enlightened One after death. 
The Buddha asks the counter-question: What happens to the 
flame when a lamp is blown out? It is a good question, because 
the flame is energy which returns into a status of potentiality or 
a more subtle realm of reality. This is by no means a specific 
Buddhist interpretation, but common Indian understanding of 
reality. Even in Vedanta it is not a gross "substance" which 
travels from one life to the next, but an energy. It is not the 
gross form of life, but the flame of life, i.e. reality (energy) on 
a more subtel level of reality which is passed on, as Muncjaka 
Upanisad III, 2 et al . states. 
13 . Pratap C h a n d r a , o p . c i t . , p. 1 2 5 , refers to O. S c h r a d e n s famous ar t ic le , 
O o t h e Prob lem of N i r v a n a , in: J . P . T . S 19Q4f., p; 1 6 3 . 
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Further, on the basis of the Mil indapanha the theory of 
bhavanga was developed which found its way into the 
Abhidamma and was taken over by Buddhaghosa . This w a s 
conceived of as a causal factor of existence, some "l i fe-conti­
n u u m " 1 4 between two rebirths, and this w a s later developed 
into a kind of stream-of-being-theory by Anuruddha (12th 
century A . D . ) . 1 5 
Hence, asking for "self" and " p e r s o n " in early Buddhism we 
have to be aware that for them reality has many levels. There 
are subtle realms which present an entity as "something", but 
not as an independently existing reality as it is the case in the 
manifestation of latent energetic processes. Therefore, the 
Buddha's majjhimä patipadä (middle path) might not just 
indicate the inexpressibility of reality, but could be something 
like complementarity in present day understanding of reality. 
We could go on in arguing that the world v iew of early 
Buddhism is more intell igible-neither " s o u l " nor " n o t - s o u l " -
than often admitted. The Sauträntikas developed their samtäna-
doctrine of continuity not without reason. Here, the vasanas 
are imprints into the continuum of c o n s c i o u s n e s s wh ich form 
structures, and this is the basis for later Yogäcära develop­
m e n t s . 1 6 Instead of mere contact (sparsa) it is now coordination 
(särüpya), i.e. a structuralized relationship, which accounts for 
perception. The Sammitiyas certainly speak of some indepen­
dence of a "person", and it is no doubt that the Pudgalavädins 
had been a strong school of thought at least right into the 7th 
century A.D. , especially in the Northwest , 1 7 wh ich would have 
been impossible if they could be simply a c c u s e d of blatant 
heterodoxy (which of course w a s the charge of other schools 
which finally survived) and the question of "sel f" and "no-se l f " 
could be easily answered on the basis of the canon. 
14. E. Conze , op. c i t . , p. 1 3 2 . 
15 . de S i l v a , op. c i t . , p. 4 8 . 
16 . E . W o l f f , op . c i t . , p. 17ff. 
17 . N. Dutt, M a f i ä y ä n a B u d d h i s m , Mot i ia l B a n a r s i d a s s ( D e l h i ) , 1 9 7 7 . 
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N o w w e come to the crucial point. One of the central 
teach ings of all Buddhist schools (though differently interpreted, 
of course) is paticcasamuppädajPratityasamutpäda, the inter­
dependent origination. T w o links in the chain are of interest 
here: consc iousness (vinnäna/v/'/näna) and individuality (nama-
rüpa). What is this c o n s c i o u s n e s s ? , 
It is obvious that both sankharas and vinnäna are the factors 
carrying on in the chain of rebirths. The sankharas are 
basically mental factors determining a person's character-
Anguttara-Nikäya II, 157f. equates sankhära and sancetanä 
w h i c h is the motivation or prefiguration of a determinate or 
intentional act ion. Th is leads right into a specific Buddhist 
understanding of the relationship between volition and action 
w h i c h is distinct from the J a i n view of karman as a kind 
of material stuf f . 1 8 For the Buddhists action is basically a 
result of a mental process (cetana) which directs the other 
aggregates. Therefore, vinnäna is not just one among the 
other aggregates, but it can control their flux on the basis 
of karmic conditions and is therefore the centre for freedom 
wh ich is necessary for the whole Buddhist path and finally 
liberation. A s it is stated at the beginning of the Dhammapada: 
manopubbangama dharnma, ail is directed by the mind. 
Indeed, already in early Buddhism vinnäna khandha has 
a distinct function w h i c h in other schools of thought are 
attributed to some kind of self or person. This is supported by 
a look into Rhys Davids Pal i -Engl ish Dictionary where the 
whole spectrum of the term is quite clear; vinnäna is linked 
to five different sets of mean ings: it is one of the aggregates 
(khandha), it is listed as an element (dhätu), it is one of 
the links in paticcasamuppada, it is a kind of sustenance (ähära) 
and finally refers to a body (käya). There seem to be two 
general concepts behind it, one would be vinnäria as an 
empirical consc iousness wh ich depends on sensations, the 
1 8 . Pra tap C h a n d r a , o p . p i t . , pp . 188f f . 
8 
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sense-organ and the sense-object , the other being a distinct 
and individuated vinnäna which is something like a subtle 
body. 
The first is the generally accepted basis for Buddhist 
epistemology and theory of perception, as it is stated concisely 
in Majjhima-Nikäya III, 281: cakkhun capaticca rüpe ca 
uppajjati cakkhuvinhänam tinnam sangati phasso, based on the 
eye and connected with an object for seeing an eye-consciousness 
arises, the coincidence of the three is perception. Likewise 
with regard to the other senses so that we have six sense-
consciousnesses, including manovinnäna wh ich , according to 
Majjhima-Nikäya 1, 295, coordinates the others in such a way 
that it al lows for a multi-sensual perception. Otherwise we 
would perceive different worlds of forms, sounds etc. without 
being able to link them. Thus, whereas the consciousnesses 
connected with the senses are basically passive in relying 
on the sense-organ as directing agent, manovinnäna is an 
active coordinator which w e could call "subjectivity" in a 
certain sense, there is even a tendency to substitute it for 
a "se l f " . 1 9 This has often been overlooked and requires 
explanat ion-what does this subjectivity imply for our interpre­
tation of anatta? 
The second concept, vinnäna as an individuated subtle 
body, has to do with the karmic interconnection between two 
births. It is said that vinnäna descends into the w o m b right 
at the moment of physical copulation between the parents. 
In the Mahanidana Sutta of Digha-Nikäya II, 63 the descent 
(okkamissatha) of vinnäna is a precondition for the next link 
in the chain of interdependent origination w h i c h is näma-
rüpa. It is näma-rüpa which provides a " footho ld" 2 0 for 
19. An a n a l y s i s of related texts in given by P e r e z - R e m o n , o p . c i t . , p. 6 1 , 6 9 , 
118 . 
2 0 . Pratap Chandra , op. c i t . , 1 9 2 . However , his genera l iz ing s ta tement : 
" W h a t jiva does in J a i n i s m for the perpetuation of p e r s o n a l i t y , vinnäna 
does in ear ly B u d d h i s m . " (p . 1 9 1 ) , is an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . 
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vinnäqa, and based on the elements there is descent into 
the womb (gabbhassavakkanti), Anguttara-Nikaya 1,176. What 
is interesting is the difference between näma which is the 
function of mental factors in a personality related to and 
depending on all the other aggregates, and vinnäna, which, 
being a precondition in the chain, must be beyond it. Would 
it be possible to take vinnäna as a kind of dependent factor 
of a different order of subtlety? It is, after all, not only Karma 
which transmigrates, but maybe this vinnana which is certainly 
not an entity of independent nature but a function or capacity, 
maybe an all-pervading latent energy, which comes to 
actualization under certain conditions and in dependence on 
other factors as is seen both in the theory of perception and 
in the theory of descent. This would also give a coherent 
interpretation to the stories of suicide of an arahant where a 
"subtle f ield" is being searched for. 
No doubt, vinnäna is not an independent self, it is 
empty (sünya) with regard to substantial self-nature (svabhäva). 
It is a structuralizing potentiality which forms and is being 
formed in the process of becoming and decaying. Therefore, 
it is able to "carry" karmic seeds so that it can account 
for the necessary continuity in the chain of rebirths. Since 
it is not a static self, but a self related to all other factors, the 
question whether it is distinct in each individuality would be an 
abstraction. 
But these are the problems discussed in the philosophical 
circles which later formed a kind of new paradigm in Buddhist 
history: Mahäyana. The philosophical developments are by no 
means the only and most important factors accounting for the 
emergence of Mahäyana. Social factors, cultural-religious influ­
ences, especial ly the emergence of bhakti-movements all over 
India wh ich influenced Brahmanical culture (Bhagavad-Gitä) 
and Buddhism (Lotos-Sütra) simultaneously and partly with 
the same effects, the necessity to bridge laity and monks, finan­
cial developments in connection with the Stüpa-worship etc. 
116 S E L F A N D C O N S C I O U S N E S S 
are other po in ts . 2 1 What I wanted to show is that developments 
in Mahäyäna, as for instance the concept of sünyata (emptiness) 
in Mädhyamika and the notion of älaya-vijnäna (store-consci­
ousness) in Vijnänaväda are consequences and logical conclu­
sions on the basis of early Buddhist v iews and interpretations. 
3 . A s p e c t s in M a h a y a n a 
Early Buddhism taught selflessness with regard to the 
person on the basis of the intuition of anicca, but concerning 
the outside world, i.e. khandhas and dhötus, they held a realistic 
pluralism. These aggregates or elements did exist, though in 
a specific sequence of time which w a s accountable for uninter­
rupted new formation. Thus we have a realistic momentariness. 
It is my impression that the fundamental paradigm shift 
between early Buddhism and Mahayana - taking place already 
in certain schools such as the Mahäsamghikas - is the refutation 
of this realistic pluralism, not any theory of soul or not-soul I 
The Prajfiäpäramitä literature, based on the cultural develop­
ments mentioned at the end of the last section and a new and 
deeper, to my mind also more consisting, interpretation of what 
w a s experienced in trans-rational meditative states, this litera­
ture interprets the Buddhist path to realization or liberation from 
an entirely transrational point of view. The key term is sünyata, 
which is actually more a programme or a matrix of a specific 
symbolic interpretation of reality (or reality as symbol) than a 
philosophical term with a definite or even definable meaning. 
This became the corner-stone for all Mahayana philosophy, both 
Mädhyamika and Yogäcära. The meaning of sünyata over 
against the earlier and more limited anatta is simply that there 
is no limited entity which would be characterized by svabhäva 
whatsoever. There is no objective reality wh ich is distinguished 
by any marks giving it an absolute identity, and in that sense 
(and only as s u c h ! ) there is universal unreality or emptiness. 
2 1 . N. Datt , op . c i t . , pp. 81f f . , et a l . 
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To realize this truth is supreme enlightenment because it frees 
from any possible attachment - there is not anything to be 
attached to. The one attached and the thing being attached 
to are no objective realities or distinct entities, and therefore the 
process of attachment reveals its true nature: it is empty. This 
lack of inherent existence (n/Jjsvabhäva) is the core of sünyatä, 
or expressed with regard to early Buddhist philosophy, there is not 
only pudgalanairatmya but, much more comprehensive and 
consequent, dharmanairätmya. This, once more, is the great and 
new insight of Mahäyana. It sheds a completely new light on the 
process of liberation and its social implications, thus paving the 
way for a bodhisattvayäna based on the teaching of tathägata-
garbha w h i c h would be impossible without the comprehensive 
matrix of sünyatä. It sheds new light on the understanding of 
reality as s u c h , including, of course, understanding of consc iou­
sness. And this is the only point which interests us here, 
though we will realize that it is the fundamental point, 
because this new understanding of consciousness is the frame­
work in which all the other questions are being resolved. 
Before I wil l d iscuss only some points I will , however, try 
to give a brief survey on the different schools with regard to 
our top ic . 2 2 
For all schools there is no dispute that sünyatä does not 
mean that nothing exists. Rather, sünyatä, though being with­
out quality, means, that all, what is, exists because of a cause 
(different from itself in Präsangika-Mädhyamika) in and relation 
to other things and causes. Any phenomenon has actually no 
real Origin but is empty. Präsangika-Mädhyamika adds, that 
2 2 . B a s e d on T h . S t c h e r b a t s k y , B u d d h i s t L o g i c V o l . I- I I , Dover ( N e w Y o r k ) , 
1 9 6 2 ; T . R . V . Mur t i , The Central Ph i losophy of B u d d h i s m , U n w i n Pb . 
( L o n d o n ) , 1 9 8 0 ; N. Datt , op . c i t , e s p . pp. 178f f . ; The X I V . Dala i L a m a , 
Universa l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the G o o d Heart , L ibrary of T ibetan Works 
& A r c h i v e s ( D h a r a m s a l a ) , 1 9 8 1 , pp . 97ff . S e e a l s o M. Schot t , Se i n a l s 
B e w u ß t s e i n . E in Bei t rag zur M a h ä y ä n a - P h i l o s o p h i e , Mater ia l ien zur 
Kunde des B u d d h i s m u s H. 2 0 , Winter (He ide lberg ) 1 9 3 5 , pp . 16ff. 
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things are only nominally imputed by consciousness, i.e. they 
are not self-existent as they appear to be. But this does not 
mean that things do not exist. 
The Self does not exist in the ordinary sense. What act­
ually is positively accepted is different in various schools. 
Yogäcära has two explanations. The self is not explained 
in relation to the aggregates, i.e. the form of a body etc., but 
only on the basis of consciousness. Now there are two v iews: 
one is to count eight consciousnesses (five sense-consc iousne­
sses , mental consciousness, a ' 'negative" or linking consc iou­
sness (manas)23 and the fundamental consciousness 'älaya-
vijnäna-), and this fundamental consciousness has the function 
of self or I; the other (earlier) view has only six levels of 
consciousness, and here the sixth one is that which exists 
as "I". 
Mädhyamika also has two s u b - s c h o o l s : Svätantr ika-Mädhy­
amika and Präsangika-Mädhyamika. In Svätantrika there again 
are two views (Yogäcära-Svätantrika-Mädhyamika and Sauträ-
ntika-Svätantrika-Mädhyamika), and both accept the sixth level 
of consciousness as a "self" independent of body and the other 
consciousnesses. The argument, of course, is, that body and 
the consciousnesses depending on the senses perish at death, 
so it must be something else what is responsible for the karmic 
chain. Präsangika-Mädhyamika, however, holds that all pheno­
mena, including different aspects or levels of consciousness, exist 
in mutual dependence. The "self", too, exists only in depende­
nce both of the physical aggregates and consciousness. There-
2 3 . It is a l s o c a l l e d klista mano-vijnäna, b e c a u s e the p r o c e s s of de f i l ed 
inte l lect ion is a l w a y s going on in it w h e r e a s älaya i s indeterminate 
object iv i ty . It w o r k s out the determinate categor izat ion w h i c h ; is n e c e s ­
sary for l inking the älayavijnäna w i th the s i x s e n s e - c o n s c i o u s n e s s e s 
{pravrtti-vijndnas). For a deta i led a n a l y s i s s e e A . K . Chat ter jee , The 
Y o g a c a r a I d e a l i s m , M o t i l ä l Öanarsidass ( D e l h i ) , 1 9 7 5 2 , p. 101ff . 
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fore, ' T ' is a mere designation referring to the process of conne­
ction between body and consciousness. Consciousness and 
"self", therefore, are not identical. 
a) Mädhyamika 
I will start with Candrakkti 's view of self and consciousness, 
because it has become the basis for later classifications and 
discriminations concerning mind, mental states and so on in 
Madhyamika, especially the Präsangika s c h o o l . 2 4 
Candrakirti starts from the discrimination between two 
different kinds of notion of se l f . 2 5 First, self can mean the 
person or I as a conventionally existing phenomenon which is 
nominally imputed onto the collection of the five mental and 
physical aggregates. S u c h a self does exist only conventionally, 
because it cannot be found under logical analysis as Candrakirti 
explains by his Sevenfold Reasoning. Second, self can mean 
inherent existence or self-sufficient existence, and such a self 
does not exist at all, not even conventionally. This kind of self 
which does not exist at all is the object being negated when 
one meditates on the selflessness (sünyatä) of persons. Thus, 
the emptiness of a person is its lack of inherent existence. 
To be a little bit more precise it is useful to distinguish eight 
different meanings of self in Präsangika-Mädhyamika, but all of 
2 4 . Candrakir t i , C a t u ^ a t a k a , in: V . B h a t t a c a r y a , The C a t u h s a t a k a of Ä r v a -
d e v a , with Ex t rac ts from the Commentary of Candrak i r t i , The Indian 
P r e s s ( A l l a h a b a d ) , 1 9 2 8 , pp. 831f f . ; H. T a u s c h e r , Candrak i r t i : M a d h y a -
makävstära l i und M a d h y a m a k ä v a t ä r a b h ä s y a m (Kap . V I , 1 6 6 - 2 6 6 ) , 
Wiener Studien zur T ibeto logie und B u d d h i s m u s k u n d e , H. 5: Universi tät 
W i e n / 1 9 8 1 ; C a n d r a k i r t i , Supp lement to Nägär juna 's Treat ise on the 
Middle W a y , D h a r a m s a l a e d . For the f o l l o w i n g exp lana t ions I rely a l s o 
on J . Hopkins, Medi ta t ion on E m p t i n e s s , W i s d o m Pub l . ( L o n d o n ) , 1 9 8 3 . 
2 5 . J . W i l s o n , C h a n d r a k i r t i ' s Seven fo ld R e a s o n i n g : Medi tat ion on the 
S e l f l e s s n e s s o f P e r s o n s , Library of Tibetan Works & A r c h i v e s ( D h a r a m s a l a ) , 
1 9 8 0 , pp. 12 f . 
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them come under the two different types which I have explain­
e d . 2 6 
1. Self in terms of Ί " or person (pudga/a) as that which 
is being nominally imputed on the five aggregates as a kind of 
functioning modus concerning their collective interplay. This 
is, says Candrakirti, how the self should be apprehended. The 
basis for imputation are the aggregates which are empty of 
inherent existence, and this is precisely what is being negated. 
2. This self which is a referent object of a false conception 
because it appears to show inherent existence, does not have 
any existence at all. It is what is called inherent existence 
(svabhäva-siddhi) or natural existence (svalaksana-siddhi). It is 
a subtle concept and difficult to remove, probably, because it is 
the root cause for attachments. 
3. This notion of self conceives a person (being imputed 
on the aggregates) being of different character from the aggrega­
tes, because it is in control of them and not seen as dependent 
on them. This, says Candrakirti, is based on a secondary 
intellectual reasoning once the l is imputed. 
4. The self as permanent, partless and independent entity 
is the self referred to in other systems such as Vedänta and is 
negated, of course, in Präsangika-Mädhyamika. 
5. The view of "mine" (atmiya) is much debated and again 
subdivided. It arises as false view in dependence on the colle­
ction of aggregates regarding them or their functional occurences 
(feelings, actions etc.) as "mine". We could say that it is a 
mental substructure in the person's own continuum, an impu­
tation on imputation, which is crucial in obstructing liberation 
from Samsära. To quote Candrakirti who states in his "Clear 
W o r d s " : 2 7 "That which pertains to the self is the mine; the term 
2 6 . C p . the useful chart by W i l s o n , op. c i t . , pp. 13ff. 
2 7 . Candrak i r t i , C lear W o r d s . Commenta ry on Fundamenta l Text c a l l e d 
" W i s d o m " XV I I I : 2 c d , quoted a c c . to W i l s o n , op. c i t . , p. 2 7 . 
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refers to one's own five aggregates. The conventionally existing 
self is the object of the conception of an I. The mine, the 
aggregates and so on, are the objects of the conception of 
mine. Due to the pacification, i.e. the non-arising or non-
observation of the true existence (of the I and mine) the yogi 
annihilates the conception of an I and the conception of mine". 
6. The self as a mode of consciousness conceiving a " s e l f 
(ätmagräha) of type 2 - 4 , i.e. a "sel f" within the " s e l f having 
a wrong conception of reality in conceiving the same as 
inherently existent. 
7. The self as a mode of consciousness conceiving an I 
in one's own continuum of consciousness which is not aware 
of the mechanism of imputation and is therefore wrong. 
8. This conception of I and mine corresponds to a cons­
ciousness conceiving I (Nr.7) . The self being negated here 
is a "conceiver" which is as it were the subject of " l -and-mine-
arising", and it appears differently than it is in reality. 
We see, the differentiation being made here is quite subtle, 
but all is an application of sünyatä with regard to the mental 
process conceiving I or self on different levels or stages of 
reasoning. In Präsangika-Mädhyamika 2 8 both persons and all 
other phenomena are lacking inherent existence, i.e. they are 
sünya. The mere I, however, exists as an imputation on the 
five aggregates. If they do not appear, this I cannot appear. 
But now comes a crucial addition: The false view of an 
inherently existing self which does not recognize this imputation 
as such, can come into being only when the aggregates 
are conceived as truly existing. Thus, the general insight into 
sünyatä concerning the dharmas and skandhas is being called 
for ! Nevertheless, meditation on emptiness occurs always 
with regard to the person, because that is where clinging 
2 8 . Der X I V . Da la i L a m a , K i n d n e s s , C lar i ty and Insight, S n o w Lion P u b l . 
( I t h a c a ) , 1 9 8 4 , pp. 162f . 
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and all the klesas are to be removed. Or to put it in other 
words: "Persons, however, also lack existence as self-sufficient 
or substantial entities and as permanent partless and independ­
ent selves. Phenomena other than persons are not meditated 
upon as being empty of these modes of existence for the 
simple reason that there is no innate conception of either 
of these two in phenomena other than persons" . 2 9 
On this basis w e do not have to comment on Candrakirti 's 
mode of Sevenfold Reasoning concerning selflessness in deta i l 
yet the seven steps shall be just ment ioned. 3 0 He compares 
the aggregates with the parts of a chariot and the "sel f" 
with that what is called "chariot" but does not exist inde­
pendently or apart from the parts: 
1. There is no chariot which is other than its parts. 
2. There is no chariot which is the same as its parts. 
3. There is no chariot which inherently possesses its parts. 
4. There is no chariot which inherently depends on its parts. 
5. There is no chariot upon which its parts are inherently 
dependent. 
6. There is no chariot which is the mere collection of 
its parts. 
7. There is no chariot which is the shape of its parts. 
Likewise there is no self which could be found separate 
from the basis of designation, i.e. the aggregates. Position 
6 is a refutation of the view of Svatantrik as who held that 
the continuum or collection of moments of the mental c o n s ­
ciousness would be the self wh ich takes rebirth. Position 
7 is said to be directed against non-Buddhist systems of 
tenets. 3 1 
2 9 . W i l s o n , op. c i t . , p. 2 5 . 
3 0 . Candrak i r t i , Commentary on " A S u p p l e m e n t " , quoted a c c . to W i l s o n , 
op . c i t , pp. 30ff . 
3 1 . W i l s o n , op . c i t . p. 3 3 . 
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I do not want to go into details concerning the rationality 
of the Präsangika system concerning our subject but shall 
briefly summarize the functioning of the argumentation with 
regard to the understanding of consciousness, based on the 
explanation given by the XIV. Dalai L a m a . 3 2 
What actually is consciousness according to Präsangika-
Mädhyamika? Human beings have five sense organs, thus-
on the basis of the collaboration of organ, sense-consciousness 
and object being perceived, as explained ear l ie r -one can see, 
hear, smell, taste and touch something. Now, what happens 
when one meditates and cuts off mental awareness from 
these sensual impressions, what remains? First of all, the 
mind gets occupied with inner imagery, memories and so on. 
Once the meditator has gone through this stage there might 
be still an awareness of present, past and future, but this 
also disappears with continuing purification of the process 
of consciousness. What remains now is a clear, undisturbed 
and non-dual mind. We shall come back to the notion of 
non-dual which is different in Präsangika and Yogäcära thought. 
Now, when this mind is investigated intoit is clear that it 
does not have any characteristic marks of form, location, origin 
and so on. 
Thus, when consciousness is out of contact with an object 
it is empty like a vast limitless ocean. But as soon as it 
comes in contact with an object it gets an experience or 
reflection of the same, it is, as it were, shaped (passive) 
by the qualities of objects and reflects them (active), like a 
mirror, which is what it is, but reflects immediately the image 
put in front of it. Thus, the true nature of consciousness 
comprises both, getting a clear knowledge about any given 
object and reflecting that experience to the one who experiences 
the object. Now, is this vast or limitless emptiness the true 
3 2 . The X I V Dala i L a m a , Universa l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the G o o d Heart, 
op. c i t . , pp. 53f f . 
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nature of consc iousness? No. Because what has been said 
so far was an analysis of the function of consciousness only 
when it is related to a concrete experience. This, therefore, 
is an understanding of the relative nature of consciousness. 
There are more levels and aspects to be taken into account, 
however. 
If you take all the attributes and aspects of conscious­
ness you come from level to level, from mode to mode. All 
composed things, however, are impermanent. S ince c o n s ­
ciousness has levels, modes etc. it is composed, therefore 
impermanent. This impermanence is one of the aspects of 
its nature. 
Consciousness depends on factors like anything composed. 
Only on the superficial level it appears as a self-existing 
entity. But it is also not a mere designation, as shown above. 
Any moment of consciousness is depending on a former 
moment of consciousness. But more, it is also depending 
on the conditions for its arising, as explained by Candrakirti. 
To be not independently existing, therefore, is the true nature 
of consciousness, it is the ultimate nature of the self. 
S o you have two levels: the ultimate nature of c o n s ­
ciousness and the knowledge of this ultimate nature of c o n s ­
ciousness. The first one is the basis, and the second its 
attribute. Consciousness or self is the basis - being not inde­
pendently existing - , and all possible modes of consc iousness 
are its attributes. But basis and attributes are of one and 
the same nature: Consciousness which is not inherently 
existing and its nature, emptiness with regard to inherent 
existence, are one and the same. Emptiness penetrates every­
thing as its true nature. 
If w e regard consciousness as subject and the final nature 
of consciousness as its object we can comprehend the ultimate 
nature of consciousness properly. This is thedirect experience of 
emptiness as direct and non-dual experience of consc iousness . 
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The result is that greed, hatred and all other klesas are 
eradicated, because they depend on the duality of grasper 
and grasped. 
For Candrakirt i , 3 3 and consequently in Präsangika-Mäd­
hyamika, non-duality means prajiia which is free from both the 
extremes of the view of permanence and the view of anni­
hilation. Thus, it is an other word for the epistemological 
principle of mädhyamika and not an ontological or psychological 
description of the nature of reality concerning the duality 
of matter and consciousness. This is precisely the basic 
point of difference between Präsangika and Yogäcära-Svätant-
rika-Mädhyamika but mainly between Präsangika and Yogäcära/ 
Cittamätra. 
b) Yogäcära 
With regard to the Lankävatära-Sütra D.T. S u z u k i 3 4 has 
observed that three terms refer to the same reality of the deepest 
level of consciousness from different angles and on different 
historical background : 1. citta, which from the very beginning 
of Buddhist history of thought was related to the theory of 
perception and functions of the mind, 2. älayavijnäna, which is 
the most comprehensive psychological term in relation to the 
w/wäf/ra-tradition, 3. tathagata-garbha, which is a religious term 
referring to the possibility of liberation for everybody. 
Citta in a general sense refers to all possible mental pro­
cesses, but in a specific sense it is different from manas and the 
vijnänas of the different senses. They signify specif ic functions, 
whereas citta is the "principle of unification by which all the 
activities are understood as issuing from one cent re" . 3 5 Manas, 
3 3 . Candraki r t i , Supp lement to N ä g ä n u n a ' s Trea t ise on the Middle W a y , 
quoted a c c . to W i l s o n , op . c i t . , pp. 4f . note 5 . 
3 4 . D.T. Suzuk i , S tud ies in the Laf ikävatära Sütra , Rout ledge (London) , 
1 9 3 0 , p. 2 5 4 . 
3 5 . Suzuki , op. c i t . , p. 2 4 8 . 
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however, develops within the citta, and it has two functions, 
(a) it reflects (manyati) on citta and (b) makes citta see itself 
as object iyidiyate). During this process of differentiation within 
the one citta the karmic seeds {bija), stored up nowhere else 
than in the citta (and in this connection usually called 
älayavijnäna), get actualized. The Lankävatärs Sütra puts it this 
way: cittena ciyate karma..., Karma is accumulated by 
consciousness and structuralized by the analytical function of 
consciousness - jiiänena ca vidhiyate.36 The result is that citta 
gets "enveloped" by the cloud of vc7sa/?f7-formations which 
Suzuki calls very appropriately "habitenergies". 
In early Buddhism these caittas or cetasikas were really 
distinct realities besides the contentless citta. In Yogäcära they 
are just phases in the process of consciousness which explica­
tes the implicate complexity of the one citta. Therefore, in early 
Buddhism one moment of consciousness is the combination of 
citta and the accompanying caittas, whereas in Yogäcära one 
moment of consciousness is only one phase of the citta though 
differentiating different aspects of its o w n . 3 7 
There are a view beautiful passages in the Lankävatära, and 
I quote according to Suzuki (p.256f . ) : "The Citta is in its origi­
nal naturel pure, but the Manas and others are not and by 
them various karmas are accumulated, and as the result there 
are two sorts of impurities". (754) "On account of external defile­
ments from the beginningless past the pure self is contaminated: 
it is like a soiled garment which can be cleansed". (755) " A s 
an unintelligent man seeks for the abode of sweet sound in the 
body of the lute, conch-shel l , or kettle-drum, so does he 
look for a soul within the Skandhas" . (757) This passage 
makes it quite clear that the pure citta is not to be misunder­
stood as a kind of self or substance or individual reality besides 
anything else. 
3 6 . Lankävatära Sütra, 1 5 8 - 3 , quoted a c c . to S u z u k i , op. c i t . , p. 4 0 1 . 
3 7 . A . K . Chatter jee, op, c i t . , p. 113 . 
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T h e citta now becomes obscure. Hence, the citta is full of 
phenomena and experience of past karmic events, and all what 
is a possible phenomenon of experience is nowhere else than in 
this citta, in fact, it is citta. Even the dhätus do not exist apart 
from it i.e. they are empty of inherent existence, as the Latikäva-
tära explicitely mentions in Sagäthakam 20. Cittamätra therefore 
means the ground of all differentiation which is beyond pheno­
menal reality, and that is why cittam hi sarvam, as Sagäthakam 
134 has it. But when this ground (citta) evolves (pravartate), 
all forms come into (dependent) being. 
Thus, what is stated here is a radical ontological non-dua­
lism. All forms, energies, formative energies, subtle realities 
or gross matter is nothing but explication of an implicate 
potentiality. 
This, of course, is possible only on the basis of sünyatä 
which can unify all different aspects and levels of reality 
because it al lows for their mutual interpenetration. This, in 
turn, is not just an ontological or epistemological device, but a 
soteriological instrument in order to bridge not only the different 
worlds of samsära and nirvana, but the defiled and undefiled 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 3 8 This, again, is the great insight in Mahäyana 
underlying all schools. 
The much disputed älayavijnäna is no "se l f" in the sense 
of an inherently existing entity at all. It is precisely this ground 
3 8 . Garma C . C C h a n g puts it very w e l l : " I t is b e c a u s e of Sünyatä that the 
merging or d i s s o l v i n g of al l d u a l i t i e s is made p o s s i b l e . T h i s w e have 
seen in the d i s c u s s i o n of the N o t - T w o Dharma Pr inc ip le (or the D h a r m a -
gate of non-dua l i ty ) ment ioned before in the Vimalaki r t i Sütra. 
Without S ü n y a t ä , the uni f icat ion of SamSära and N i r v a n a , the merging 
of the f ini te and inf inity, and the interpenetration and mutual conta in ­
ment of a l l beings on ai l l eve ls w o u l d not be p o s s i b l e . . . wi thout the 
real izat ion of E m p t i n e s s , the inf inite c o m p a s s i o n and a l t ru ist ic deeds of 
a Bodh isa t tva are not poss ib le . . . The w a y to Buddhahood is to do a l l 
good deeds wi th a spir i t imbued w i t h Thorough E m p t i n e s s , free from al l 
a t tachment" . (The Buddhis t T e a c h i n g of Tota l i ty , A l len & U n w i n 
(London) , 1972 , p. 1 1 6 f ) . 
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of potentiality, depending on everything else. It is one of the 
vijnanas, though the most fundamental one in so far as it stores 
all the karmic impressions of the past. It forms, as it were, the 
matrix for the functioning of all the other processes of con­
sciousness. But in the Lankävatära it is identified with the 
Tathögata-garbha as the original and pure nature, the suchness 
of reality dormant in every being. No wonder that Mahämati 
got confused and asked the Buddha whether this is not a 
permanent self, very much like the ätman. And here is the 
Buddha 's answer : " 0 Mahämati , the doctrine of the ätman by 
the philosophers is not the same as my teaching of the tathä-
gata-garbha. For what the Tathägatas teach is emptiness 
(hlnyatä), limit of reality (bhütakoti), Nirvana, no-birth, no-
appearance, no-desire (apranihita), and such other conceptions, 
with which the tathägata-garbha is characterised, and by which 
the ignorant are saved from the occasion of cherishing a sense 
of fear about the Buddhist teaching of non-ego . . . " . 3 9 
The vijnanas depend on the älayavijnäna, and they in 
turn mistake phenomena for independently existing "things' ' 
instead of realizing that they all are projections of different 
levels of citta. But when all the karmic seeds in the älaya 
are stilled and eradicated, emptiness appears. In other words : 
non-duality arises as soon as the discriminating factors within 
citta disappear. 
This is an extremely brief attempt to characterize the 
nature of consciousness in Yogäcära thought, all subtleties 
being neglected here. I doubt that it is useful to call cittamätra 
a form of idealism, as Suzuki does. W h y ? First because of 
the history of Yogäcära thought. It is rather well established, 
that Vasubandhu in his Trimsatikä does not speak about a 
cosmic consciousness, but about the appearance of things 
in an individual consciousness, i.e. in their subjectivity {ätman) 
3 9 . Lankävatära Sütra, quoted a c c . to S u z u k i , p. 259 f . 
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and their objectivity (dharma) both of which are only mental 
const ruc ts . 4 0 Though this, of course, is different in later 
Yogäcära, it is the background of philosophical debate. But 
second with regard to fully developed Yogäcära: because 
of the emptiness of citta. This is consciousness in Yogäcära: 
an infinite continuum which has the potential of self-differenti­
ation, but in itself, at its deepest level it is absolutely quiet 
and non-dual . All what happens, happens within this self-
differentiation. But even this ground or deepest level is "no ­
thing", it is empty of inherent existence, pure process, one 
could say. 
What matters is not to hold a view of self or no-self. 
Even a "v iew of no-sel f" can become a fixed notion, a subst­
antialized mental phenomenon, and thus turn into what Mahäy­
ana calls "inherent existence" or self ! Emptiness also must 
be emptied. What remains is the continuous process of emptying. 
This is the nature or better the adventure of consciousness, 
its final ground which is no-ground, of course. 
4 . C o n c l u s i o n 
I will not try a synthesis here, much less a critical 
examination of the question how to proceed under a cross-
cultural perspective. I just would like to summarize a few 
basic distinctions which are essential for an understanding of 
consciousness in the context of sünyatä in Mahäyäna-Buddhism 
without investigating the basic difference between Präsangika-
Mädhyamika and Yogäcära concerning the subtle dualism 
(of mind and matter) of the first one and the radical non-
dual citta mätra-doctrine of the second one. My attempt is 
to show the implications of the whole discussion for our 
mental training on the basis of an understanding of the different 
levels of consciousness as presented in Mahäyana. 
4 0 . C p . the exce l lent study of T r i m s a t i k ä by T h . A . Kochumuttom in h i s : A 
B u d d h i s t Doctr ine of Exper ience , Mot i la l B a n a r s i d a s s ( D e l h i ) , 1 9 8 2 / 
e s p . pp . 170ff . 
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1. The core of all Buddhist philosophy is the study of 
consciousness, because it is consciousness wh ich is accountable 
for all actions, emotions and thoughts wh ich are to be purified 
in order to attain liberation. Whatever consc iousness is defined 
to be, all philosophical endeavour has this soteriological 
motivation. 
2. Consciousness is the fundamental reality, a beginning-
less and endless continuum of processes. Buddhism refers 
to this continnum both in logical analysis and in direct 
meditative perception. Consc iousness cannot originate from 
nothing nor from matter, and therefore its source is a former 
moment of consciousness. This is an important argument 
used to establish the rationality of belief in rebirth. 
3. Some Sütras compare the ground of consciousness 
(citta) with an ocean and the different mental states or 
processes in consciousness (caitta) with the ripples on the 
surface of the ocean. In Yogäcära citta is the one reality 
or a universal consciousness in wh ich all processes emerge 
and, after their disappearance, leave formative traces (bija) 
for further processes. Even in what w e call matter this cons­
cious principle is latent, and the development of this conscious 
principle towards full maturity, wh ich is Buddhahood, is the 
evolutionary process in Buddhism. In Präsafigika-Mädhyamika, 
however, there is always an extremely subtle duality of most 
subtle mind (in Tibetan 'od gsal, the clear light) and most 
subtle matter, which is its supporting energy (präna, rlung). 
4. The essential nature of consc iousness is its emptiness 
with regard to inherent existence (sünyata), it is pure potentiality 
as process of its own luminosity and faculty of knowing. 
The most subtle level of this continuum is undestructible and 
lasting from birth to birth, being completely purified right 
into Buddhahood. 
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5. Consc iousness is not only a store for information 
resulting from karmic processes, but it is the active process 
of knowing. Here, one differentiates between attentiveness 
(buddhi) and knowledge (/nana). Only by intensification and 
purification of consc iousness attentiveness can become so 
undivided and knowledge so clear that the ultimate nature 
of consc iousness can be perceived directly. The purification 
is essentially an eradication of the klesas which produce 
karmic defilments of which the most fundamental one is the 
false notion of a substantial self as an entity of its own 
(svabhava). This "se l f" tries to establish its wrong identity 
by all sorts of clinging and therefore intensifies the illusion 
of its existence by further illusion, greed and hatred. What 
is the problem of beings, therefore, is the wrong perception 
of an absoluteness of differentiated or individuated reality. 
6. What is perceived in the direct perception of cons­
ciousness by a purified consc iousness? The ultimate emptiness 
of consciousness is perceived, i.e. the most subtle level of 
the continuum of consc iousness which has no limiting 
determinations whatsoever . It is no substance, but pure light 
beyond any conceptual perception and duality. It has no 
beginning and no end. It is a lways present in all beings. 
It is their ultimate nature. 
7. From a theistic point of view the Buddhist philosophy 
of consciousness and emptiness allows a more comprehensive 
view of the person. What later w a s developed by East-
Asian Buddhism with its doctrine of mutual interpenetration 
of i all phenomena (based on the Avatamsaka-Sütra) has 
relevance today for a unified world-view. The basic question 
is not self or no-se l f , but on a more comprehensive level: 
fragmentation or unity of reality. 
